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RONALD D. ROTUNDA*
Many legal and lay commentators have hurled unusually harsh criticism at the
US. Supreme Court decision in Bush v. Gore. Typical detractors claim that a
bare majority of five Justices decided the case based on their political
preference, not precedent. This article examines this opinion to see if these
charges are justified, and demonstrates that seven Justices (not five), concluded
that the Florida Supreme Court acted unconstitutionally. Moreover, their
conclusion was hardly surprising, given a long line of precedent applying the
equal protection and due process guarantees to prevent states from manipulating
voting results, diluting ballots based on geography, or counting them with no
articulated standard or an ever-changing one. In addition, this article analyzes
the additional ground for decision that three Justices embraced, and confirms
that there is ample precedent empowering federal courts to reject state court
rulings interpreting state law when those decisions are not reasonably
anticipated from prior law and do not rest on an adequate and independent state
ground
I. INTRODUCTION
What is the connection, if any, between Bush v. Gorel-the case that held
that the Florida Supreme Court's rules for recounting presidential election ballots
violated the Constitution-and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001? If you
said "none," that would have been my choice as well. But that is not the way that
Deborah Dosh of Flagstaff, Arizona sees things. In response to an article
mourning the death of Barbara Olson, who was a passenger on the hijacked plane
that the terrorists crashed into the Pentagon,2 Ms. Dosh sent to the author, Ann
Coulter, an email that said in part:
I usually consider myself a good person, one who would never be happy at the
demise of another human being, but, I have to say, that the first thing that came
to mind when I heard about Barbara Olson being on that [hiacked] plane [that
crashed into the Pentagon on September 11, 2001], was, I hope Ted was with
her. Do you realize ... [that] he is responsible for us having a dictator in the
White House[?] 3
* The George Mason University Foundation Professor of Law, George Mason University
School of Law.
1 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (Dec. 12,2000) (per curiam).
2 Ann Coulter, This is War, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Sept. 13, 2001, at
http://www.nationalreview.com/coulter/coulterO91301.shtml.
3 Email from Deborah Dosh to Ann Coulter (Sept. 16, 2001, 04:00:59 PM) (on file with
author) (emphasis added). The full email to Ms. Coulter states:
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Ted Olson, who is now the Solicitor General, had argued Bush v. Gore4 on behalf
of the petitioner. Many of us might be surprised to learn that Mr. Olson's role as a
lawyer 5 in that case would inspire such shocking email. Yet, this incident
illustrates how negatively some people continue to feel about Bush v. Gore nearly
a year after the decision.
Academics may think that they are above such hyperbole, but many of them
share this odium for this decision and make no effort to sugarcoat their criticism.
Thus, Professor Alan Dershowitz of Harvard Law School asserts:
[T]he decision in the Florida election case may be ranked as the single most
corrupt decision in Supreme Court history, because it is the only one that I know
of where the majority justices decided as they did because of the personal
Ms. Coulter,
I had the ill pleasure to read your article about "your good friend" Barbara Olson and her
sweetie pie of a husband, Ted.
I usually consider myself a good person, one who would never be happy at the demise of
another human being, but, I have to say, that the first thing that came to mind when I heard
about Barbara Olson being on that plane, was, I hope Ted was with her.
Do you realize how many people hate those two individuals? At least half of America,
that's who. She was a hate monger and he is responsible for us having a dictator in the
White House.
I have read or listened to ultra right wing, hateful, demoralizing rhetoric from you, Barbara
Olson, Cheney and Ingraham, for so long, that it is gratifying to know that I will no longer
need to see that woman's face on TV again. Actually, I was happy when CNN showed
that awful frowning photograph of her on the news the day before. It showed her true
nature as a hate monger.
You. want to call people like me terrorists, because we celebrate her passing, well, go
ahead. I am ten times more patriotic than you will ever dream of being. I have two flags
flying outside my house, I will even go so far as to support Bush's bosses, to a degree, but
when it comes to killing innocent boys, in the name of Bush's corporate donors, and the
gains to be made from warfare, I will take down those flags and fly them upside down. For
then, our country will truly be in distress.
You need to keep your overbearing mouth shut. You and all of your Paul-Whyrich and
Scaife, Arkansas Project cronies are a detriment to this country. Isn't it ironic that she died
at the hands of terrorists, after all the money and time you all committed to this terrorist
supporting group of asses?
Sincerely,
Deborah Dosh
Flagstaff, Az
4 Bush, 531 U.S. at 98 (Dec. 12,2000).
5 As a matter of legal ethics, a lawyer's representation of client does not constitute
endorsement of client. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(b) (2002); RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, LEGAL ETHics § 3-1.3, at 72-73 (2002).
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identity and political affiliation of the litigants. This was cheating and a violation
of the judicial oath.6
While some law professors have defended the decision,7 hundreds of others have
accused the Justices of acting not as judges but as "political proponents for
candidate Bush.' 8 Over seven months after Bush v. Gore-a time when tempers
had time to cool-a former Congressperson persuaded the Oregon Democratic
Party to endorse an effort to impeach the five U.S. Supreme Court Justices who
joined the per curiam opinion.9
It is no little thing to call an opinion "corrupt" and accuse its authors of
cheating and violating their oath. And impeachment is no small matter. The
6 Quoted in, David Savage, Book Review, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 8, 2001, available at 2001 WL
25926104; Peter Berkowitz & Benjamin Wittes, The Professors and Bush v. Gore, THE
WILSON Q., Autumn 2001, at 76, 80. Professor Dershowitz wrote: ALAN M. DERSHOWTrZ,
SUPREME INJUSTICE: How THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED ELECTION 2000 (2001) (depicting Bush
v. Gore as a decision based on the Justices' partisan views); see also Gary Kamiya, Against the
Law, SALON.COM (July 4, 2001), at http://www.salon.com/books/feature/2001/07/04/
dershowitz/index.html (arguing that the Supreme Court Justices were swayed by political
motivations in deciding Bush v. Gore).
One should be clear that all of the Justices on the Supreme Court, while they have
disagreed with each other on the merits, have defended the Bush v. Gore decision as grounded
in the law. Justice Breyer, for example, remarked to a law school audience that the explanation
for this case "isn't ideology and it isn't politics." Linda Greenhouse, Election Case a Test and a
Trauma for Supreme Court Justices, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20,2001, at Al.
7 See Berkowitz & Wittes, supra note 6, at 79; Nelson Lund, The Unbearable Rightness of
Bush v. Gore, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1219, 1219 (2002) (defending Bush v. Gore as a decision
grounded in legal principle and precedent); see also Max Boot, Law Professors v. the Supreme
Court, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 2001, at A13 (describing the partisan label that some law
professors attach to Bush v. Gore as "disingenuous"). Compare Steven K. Balman, Bush v.
Gore-A Response to Dean Belsky, 37 TULSA L.J. 777 (2002) (arguing that the constitutional
criticisms of Bush v. Gore are without foundation), with Martin H. Belsky, Bush v. Gore-A
Critique of Critiques, 37 TULSA L.J. 45 (2002) (postulating that Bush v. Gore damaged the
American polity's conception that society is governed by laws and not by political parties).
8 On January 13, 2001, over 550 law professors from 120 American law schools placed a
full-page advertisement in the New York Times claiming that the Justices had acted as "political
proponents for candidate Bush, not as judges." 554 Law Professors Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13,
2001, at A7. The advertisement did not mince words: "By taking power from the voters, the
Supreme Court has tarnished its own legitimacy." Dave Sweifel, Court's Decision Still Rankles
Law Profs, CAP. TIMES (Madison, Wis.), Jan. 24, 2001, at 6A; Berkowitz & Wittes, supra note
6, at 80; see also Joel Edan Friedlander, The Rule of Law at Century's End, 5 TEX. REv. L. &
POL. 318, 338 (2001); Lund, supra note 7, at 1219 n.2 (listing professors who have attacked
Bush v. Gore, with many of the attackers being "particularly vituperative"). Professor Lund's
article presents an extensive and thorough analysis and defense of the decision and I am
indebted to him.
9 See Oregon Moves to Impeach Justices: Democrats Seek a Query Into High Court's
Ruling, WASH. POST, July 23, 2001, at A7. Former Congressperson Charles Porter (D. Ore.) led
this effort.
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denunciations from laypeople like Ms. Dosh, from many media commentators, 10
and from distinguished academics like Professor Dershowitz, are serious. Are
they valid? Is it fair to say that a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court Justices
cheated, ignored the law, and violated precedent in concluding that the Florida
Supreme Court's ruling was unconstitutional? Is it correct, as detractors of this
decision maintain, that only a bare five-person majority (the number who joined
the per curiam opinion) concluded that the Florida Supreme Court recount order
violated the Constitution? l I Or, is even this assertion part of the hyperbole; in
other words, did five or seven members of the U.S. Supreme Court conclude that
the Florida recount procedures violated equal protection?
Three members of the Florida Supreme Court dissented from the ruling that
the U.S. Supreme Court later reversed. Were these three state justices (none
Republicans) acting as political puppets of George W. Bush, when they argued
that their colleagues' ruling (1) substantially changed the law that had been in
place before the election for deciding such disputes, and (2) created severe equal
protection problems? 12 Or were they following existing precedent? These are the
issues that we will be exploring.
10 Comments from a typical column attacking the decision: "the majority of the Court
[with Bush v. Gore] ... has ... become quite openly the most dangerous branch." Renata
Adler, Irreparable Harm, NEW REPUBLIC, July 30, 2001, at 29.
Other columnists defended the decision and charged that there were voting irregularities
that favored Vice President Gore. See, e.g., George Will, A Long Election Day in Missouri,
WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2002, at A17:
Nov. 7, 2000-Election Day--will forever call to mind Florida's butterfly ballots
and pregnant chads. But the day was eventful in St Louis, too.
The night before, Democratic Rep. William Clay had told a Gore-Lieberman rally
that a lawsuit would be filed to force the polls to stay open longer than Missouri law
allows. The next afternoon such a suit was filed, claiming that minorities were having
trouble voting. Clay had been prescient about those troubles-or those troubles were
fictitious, and he was part of a carefully planned operation.
The suit's lead plaintiff, Robert D. Odom, complained of being denied the right to
vote. But someone noted that his problem might have something to do with the fact that he
died in 1999.
11 See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Return of Legal Realism, NATION, Jan. 8, 2001, 2001 WL
2132174:
The Court's decision in Bush v. Gore, however, seeims an exercise in low rather than
high politics .... [It] is all too easily explainable as the decision by five conservative
Republicans-at least two of whom are eager to retire and be replaced by Republicans
nominated by a Republican president-to assure the triumph of a fellow Republican who
might not become president if Florida were left to its own legal process.
12 See, e.g., Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1263 (Fla. Dec. 8, 2000) (per curiam) (Wells,
C.J., dissenting):
My succinct conclusion is that the majority's decision to return this case to the circuit
court for a count of the under-votes from either Miami-Dade County or all counties has no
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There has been much written about this case, and I do not purport either to
canvas the literature or write the definitive article on this decision. However, I
will examine the opinion and demonstrate that this decision is not a surprise,
given prior Supreme Court case law dealing with equal protection (the one
person, one vote decisions), as well as decisions dealing with procedural due
process. 13 People may certainly criticize the case-we live in a free country, after
all-but, whatever one thinks of Bush v. Gore, there was no "cheating, and a
violation of the judicial oath."'14 Instead, the seven Justices (that's right-seven,
not five) followed the existing precedent.
A. Undervotes and Overvotes
First, a little nomenclature. People who vote sometimes do not follow
instructions and do not complete the ballot correctly. In the various opinions that
culminate in Bush v. Gore, issued on December 12, 2000, there was no claim that
the voting machines were defective. The machines counted the punch card ballots
as they were designed to do. However, some voters did not punch the ballot for
any presidential candidate.
When there is no punch, that is called an "undervote." The voting machine
reads this ballot as a blank, but, if the human eye rather than the voting machine
examined the ballot, one might see an indentation, a pin prick, or a dimple near a
candidate's name. The voter may have decided not to vote for any candidate for
that office and therefore intentionally made no punch but still created an
indentation accidentally while handling the ballot. Or, the voter may not have
foundation in the law of Florida as it existed on November 7, 2000, or at any time until the
issuance of this opinion.
See also id. at 1272 (Harding, J., dissenting, joined by Shaw, J., and on this point by Wells,
C.J.):
I have serious concerns that appellant's interpretation of 102.168 would violate other
voters' rights to due process and equal protection ....
... [Tihe selective recounting requested by appellant is not available under the
election contest provisions of section 102.168. Such an application does not provide for a
more accurate reflection of the will of the voters but, rather, allows for an unfair distortion
of the statewide vote. It is patently unlawful to permit the recount of "no-votes" in a single
county to determine the outcome of the November 7, 2000, election for the next President
of the United States. We are a nation of laws, and we have survived and prospered as a
free nation because we have adhered to the rule of law. Fairness is achieved by following
the rules.
13 Cf Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional and Statutory Restrictions on Political Parties in
the Wake of Cousins v. Wigoda, 53 TEX. L. REv. 935 (1975) (discussing cases holding that
state laws regulating presidential elections must conform to equal protection and due process
guarantees).
14 Berkowitz & Wittes, supra note 6, at 80 (quoting Professor Dershowitz). See generally
DERSHOWrrZ, supra note 6.
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followed the instructions to punch through the ballot with the stylus that is
attached in the voting booth. Or, the voter may have intended to vote for one
candidate but did not follow the instructions and thus did not punch the card
correctly but left an indentation. In addition, when ballots are handled during the
manual count, indentations will occur, either by accident (people are handling the
ballot and that affects them) or on purpose (someone with a corrupt motive can
add an indentation by simply using one's fingernail).15
If the voter punches two holes for two different candidates for the same
office, that double-punch is called an "overvote." The voter may have made a
mistake. Or, the voter may intentionally cast an overvote, if he or she does not
want to vote for anyone for that particular office: and wants to make sure that the
machine reads no vote for that office. 16 The Florida ballot, as is typical
throughout the country, does not allow the voter to cast a ballot "for none of the
above." So a voter can exercise that choice and vote for "none of the above" only
by casting an intentional overvote or undervote.
The Florida Supreme Court, on December 8, 2000, decided that there should
be a manual recount of all undervotes in all of Florida and partial recounts of both
overvotes and undervotes in some counties, with no standards to judge when a
ballot has a valid marking. The Florida Supreme Court had no problem with a
partial recount that included whatever votes have been recounted, even though a
partial recount would include a biased sample of votes. 17 The U.S. Supreme
Court, on December 12, 2000, held that this recount violated equal protection and
due process.' 8 More about this later in this article.
B. The Unofficial Recounts of 2001
The claim by some academics and laypeople that the Supreme Court really
chose the next president by stopping this asymmetrical recount is, in a sense
15 The voter would cast the overvote to prevent a manual counter from later adding an
indentation (which is easily placed on the ballot with a finger nail). Yes, it happens that some
people are not honest, and not all manual counters have the virtues of Pericles.
16 See, e.g., Broward County Canvassing Bd. v. Hogan, 607 So. 2d 508, 509 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1992) (per curiam):
Appellant explained that voter errors in the piercing of computer ballot cards created loose
or hanging paper chads which, although present on the first count, subsequently fall away
on a recount, thereby causing the difference in count. Such voter errors, the board
explained, are caused by hesitant piercing, no piercing, or intentional or unintentional
multiple piercing of computer ballot cards, creating what are referred to as overvotes and
undervotes.
17 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 108 (Dec. 12, 2000) (per curiam) (citing Gore, 772 So.
2d at 1261-62 n.21 (Dec. 8, 2000)).
18 See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1247 (Fla. Dec. 8, 2000) (per curiam), rev'd sub
nom., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 98 (Dec. 12, 2000) (per curiam).
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moot, because various newspapers later collected the ballots and did their own
manual recounts of the Florida undervote ballots (which is what the Florida court
ordered) and concluded that President Bush still won a majority of the Florida
vote; Bush also won using various other standards. 19
We also know that these unofficial manual recounts took many months.20
Justice Souter had speculated that the recount could have been completed by
December 18, 2000!21 Had the recount been ordered by a court, that official
recount would have taken even many months longer than the unofficial news
media account, because, with an official manual recount, the losing party would
19 After this case, several newspapers hired auditors who examined the ballots and
reported their findings in April 2001. The Miami Herald, a major sponsor of this recount,
reported its finding:
Republican George W. Bush's victory in Florida, which gave him the White House,
almost certainly would have endured even if a recount stopped by the U.S. Supreme Court
had been allowed to go forward. In fact, a comprehensive review of 64,248 ballots in all 67
Florida counties by The Herald and its parent company, Knight Ridder, in partnership with
USA Today, found that Bush's slender margin of 537 votes would have tripled to 1,665
votes under the generous counting standards advocated by Democrat Al Gore.
Martin Merzer, Review Shows Ballots Say Bush, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 4, 2001, at Al. The
newspaper's managing editor said: "In the end, I think we probably confirmed that President
Bush should have been president of the United States." Id. He added: "I think that it was
worthwhile because so many people had questions about how the ballots had been handled and
how the process had worked." Id.; see also CNN, Recount of Florida Undervotes Confirms
Bush Victory, CNN.com, at http://www.cnn.com/200l/ALLPOLITICS/04/03/florida.recount/
index.html (Apr. 4,2001) [hereinafter, CNN Recount].
The Wall Street Journal, joined by seven other newspapers and the National Opinion
Research Center at the University of Chicago, conducted the recount that the Florida Supreme
Court had ordered-all the ballots that did not register as votes when they were counted by
machine. Jackie Calmes & Edward P. Foldessy, Florida Revisited: In Election Review, Bush
Wins Without Supreme Court Help, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2001, at A1. They reviewed 175,010
Florida ballots. The conclusion:
The results suggest that if the U.S. Supreme Court had allowed the vote counting
ordered by the Florida Supreme Court to continue, as many Democrats had advocated, Mr.
Bush still would have won the election by 493 votes. That's only a handful less than the
official victory margin of 537 votes. The study also suggests that if then-Vice President Al
Gore had won his original request for hand counts in just four heavily Democratic Florida
counties, Mr. Bush still would have won, by 225 votes.
Id.
20 The Miami Herald's team began counting the undervotes on December 18, 2000, and
concluded on March 13, 2001. See Merzer, supra note 19; CNN Recount, supra note 19.
In the case of the consortium of newspapers that included the Wall Street Journal, the
project "took more than nine months and cost nearly $1 million, [and] is likely to be as close as
anyone will ever get to a comprehensive understanding of what really happened in Florida last
fall." See Calmes & Foldessey, supra note 19, at Al.
21 See Bush, 531 U.S. at 135 (Dec. 12, 2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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have had a right to appeal to the intermediate appellate court and whoever lost
that appeal would seek a further appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, and the
losing party would then have a right to seek U.S. Supreme Court review.
Of course, what we know now is not what we knew at the time the U.S.
Supreme Court decided Bush v. Gore. At the lime, no one knew for certain if
then-Governor Bush would win a new recount if the U.S. Supreme Court had not
taken the case and if the Florida court had been able to implement a manual
recount using different (and ever-changing) standards in different parts of the state
to determine when to treat an undervote or an overvote as valid.22 We only knew,
at that point in time, that Vice President Gore had never been in the lead in the
Florida balloting and in the recounts-either in the machine recount of the entire
state, or in the court-ordered partial manual recounts of selected precincts. But,
the margin of victory for Governor Bush was very small, as a percentage of votes
cast, and Vice President Gore would gain or lose some votes depending on what
standard one used in deciding which ballots to count.
Normally, we should know the rules for counting before we count.23 That
way we cannot be accused of making up rules just to reach a particular result. We
22 See Gore, 772 So. 2d at 1269 (Fla. Dec. 8, 2000) (Wells, C.J., dissenting):
Another significant problem is that the majority [provides] ... for a recount with no
standards.... A continuing problem with these manual recounts is their reliability. It only
stands to reason that many times a reading of a ballot by a human will be subjective, and
the intent gleaned from that ballot is only in the mind of the beholder. This subjective
counting is only compounded where no standards exist ....
23 When people voted by hand, before we had 'voting machines, any recounts were
pursuant to specific rules. The typical rule is that the voter had to place an "X" in a box, and the
two lines had to cross within the box. If the voter put another mark (such as a check mark) or
had the two lines cross outside the box, the vote was not counted. Because human eyes can be
very discretionary, the law set forth very specific standards, allowed no deviation, and sought to
eliminate any aspect of human discretion.
Later, the media conducted their own unofficial recount of the ballots, and Governor Bush
still won. However, the process of conducting this recount illustrated how biased manual
counters can be:
Although some accounts stress that the counters agreed on 96 percent of punchcard
ballots, that 4 percent error rate greatly exceeded the election margin of .001 percent. This
is rather like trying to recheck a microscope's measurement of an electron's width using
the human eye and a yardstick. Moreover, the 96 percent figure is artificially inflated by
agreements on ballots where there was no marking to dispute. On ballots where at least
one counter saw a potential vote for Bush or Gore, the counters disagreed a third of the
time.
Political affiliation mattered. Though the NORC counters were supposed to be
impartial, Republican counters were 4 percent more likely than Democratic counters to
deny a mark was for Gore. Even more striking, Democrats were 25 percent more likely to
deny a mark was for Bush. This bias may well be utterly unconscious, but it remains a
problem for any manual recount process.
Einer Elhauge, Florida 2000: Bush Wins Again!, WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 26, 2001, at 29, 29.
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call it heads or tails when the coin is in the air, not after it has hit the ground. The
time to decide whether to count overvotes, or undervotes, and to decide what
should be the standards to determine when to ireat an indentation on a ballot as a
"vote" is before we begin the count. That is why the U.S. Supreme Court stopped
the manual recount, until it could decide what the rules for manually counting
ballots should be before there was a recount,24 and if those rules could be
implemented by December 12, the date that Vice President Gore and the Florida
Supreme Court had earlier regarded as the ending time.25 For a court to authorize
a manual count of the ballots before it creates the uniform standards that will
govern the recount would have poisoned the political air, for it would have
allowed the winner of that flawed process to claim a victory even if the court later
decides that the hand count was faulty or corrupt.
But, before we consider these issues in more detail, let us summarize what
the Florida Supreme Court did and what it ordered to be counted. Then, we will
determine how many Justices concluded that the Florida Supreme Court
promulgated an unconstitutional recount order. Yes, even the number of Justices
who took that position is a matter of controversy in the literature. 26
The road to the final Supreme Court decision was not a straight one but a
meandering one filled with many detours and dead-ends along the way. First, let
us take a bird's eye view of that road and then look more specifically at what the
24 See Bush, 531 U.S. at III (Dec. 12, 2000):
Seven Justices of the Court agree that there are constitutional problems with the
recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court that demand a remedy. See post, at 134
(Souter, J., dissenting); post, at 145-146 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The only disagreement is
as to the remedy. Because the Florida Supreme Court has said that the Florida Legislature
intended to obtain the safe-harbor benefits of 3 U.S.C. § 5, JUSTICE BREYER's
proposed remedy-remanding to the Florida Supreme Court for its ordering of a
constitutionally proper contest until December 18--contemplates action in violation of the
Florida Election Code, and hence could not be part of an "appropriate" order authorized by
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 102.168(8) (Supp. 2001).
25 "The Supreme Court of Florida has said that the legislature intended the State's electors
to 'participat[e] fully in the federal electoral process,' as provided in 3 U.S.C. § 5. 772 So. 2d at
1289; see also Palm Beach Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1237 (Fla. 2000)." Id. at
110.
26 In this Symposium, for example, several speakers insisted that the vote was five to four.
One speaker said that he would take "them [Souter and Breyer] at their word" when they said
that that they dissented (panel discussion on March 22, 2002, at The Ohio State University,
Michael E. Moritz College of Law). Of course, why not take them at their word when they both
said that the Florida Supreme Court acted unconstitutionally?.
Professor Alan Dershowitz argued that the decision was five to four and the Justices in the
majority "appointed precisely because their biographies showed them to be light-wing
ideologues and Republican partisans." See Savage, supra note 6. If the decision was seven to
two, and one of the seven was a Clinton appointee, Professor Dershowitz's argument is less
compelling.
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Florida Supreme Court finally ordered in its four to three decision of December 8,
2000.27
II. THE LONG AND WINDING ROAD TO BusH v. GoRE: AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE CASES LEADING TO THE DECEMBER 12, 2000 DECISION
On November 8, 2000, the day following the presidential election, the Florida
Division of Elections reported that Governor Bush had received 2,909,135 votes
for president, and Vice President Gore had received 2,907,351 votes, a margin of
1784 for Governor Bush. Florida statutes provide for an automatic machine
recount because Bush's margin of victory was less than "one-half of a percent...
of the votes cast."'28 This recount showed Governor Bush still winning the race
but by a lessened margin. 29
Vice President Gore then sought manual recounts limited to four counties,
Volusia, Palm Beach, Broward, and Miami-Dade, pursuant to Florida's election
protest provisions. (This was the "protest" period for objecting to election
returns.) A dispute arose concerning the deadline for local county canvassing
boards to submit their returns to the Secretary of State, who declined to waive the
November 14 deadline imposed by statute. The Florida Supreme Court, however,
reset the deadline to November 26. The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously
vacated the Florida Supreme Court's decision, finding considerable uncertainty as
to the grounds on which it was based, and this uncertainty raised constitutional
problems, discussed below.30
On November 26, the Florida Elections Canvassing Commission certified the
results of the election and declared Governor Bush the winner of Florida's
twenty-five electoral votes. On November 27, Vice President Gore filed a
complaint in Leon County Circuit Court contesting the certification. (This was the
"contest" period for objecting to election returns.) Gore sought relief under a state
statutory provision that provided "[r]eceipt of a number of illegal votes or
rejection of a number of legal votes sufficient to change or place in doubt the
result of the election" shall be grounds for a contest.31
The Florida State Circuit Court denied relief, finding that Vice President
Gore had failed to meet his burden of proof. He appealed to the appellate court,
which certified the matter to the Florida Supreme Court, which held (four to
27 See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1247 (Fla. Dec. 8, 2000) (per curiam), rev'd sub
noma., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (Dec. 12, 2000) (per curiam).
28 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.141(6) (West 2002).
29 It is interesting that nearly a year later, when voters were asked from whom they had
cast their ballots, they told the pollsters that they recalled voting for Bush by a margin of 42% to
30%. See Washington Wire, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2001, at Al.
30 Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 78 (Dec. 4, 2000) (per
curiam) (Bush I).
31 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(3)(c) (West 2002).
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three) that the results of the election were "in doubt." The Florida Court held that
a "legal vote," is "one in which there is a 'clear indication of the intent of the
voter.' "32 According to the state court, the manual counters are supposed to count
punch-card ballots where the voters did not follow instructions, or were not
careful in punching out the hole next to the candidate, or any other circumstance
where the ballot showed an indentation. The manual counters were supposed to
determine what the voter intended.
The Florida Supreme Court issued a ruling that allowed the manual counters
to count as a valid vote a ballot where the voter, either accidentally or on purpose,
failed to follow the voting instructions. For example, some voters do not punch
the stylus clearly through the punch card. Others may not punch at all, but leave
an indentation (what became known as a "pregnant chad") near the name of a
candidate. Some voters may not want to vote for any candidate and therefore
intentionally place no marking by the name, but, when the manual counters
handle these ballots, there may still be an indentation created accidentally (in all
good faith), corruptly, or on purpose (by a manual counter or someone else). If a
manual counter intuited that an indentation should be read as a vote, then that
counter would recast the ballot and count that vote as a valid vote for a candidate.
The manual counter would interpret the "intent" of the voter by looking at a piece
of paper that had not complied with the voting rules, because it did not have a
clean punch, or had more than one clean punch.
The Florida court had never before ruled that a manual recount should be
conducted on the grounds that the voters may not have followed directions in
punching the voting card33; its interpretation resulted in a conclusion that
"machine tabulations will always be erroneous if any voter failed to follow the
instructions for marking the ballot, which always happens."34 The Florida
Supreme Court made clear that an "error in the vote tabulation" would occur even
if all the machines were properly functioning and doing exactly what they had
been designed to do. The Florida Court specifically rejected the lower court ruling
that an "error in the vote tabulation" only means "a counting error resulting from
incorrect election parameters or an error in the vote tabulating software, '35 or
"errors resulting from the voting machinery." 36
32 Gore, 772 So. 2d at 1257 (Dec. 8, 2000).
33 See Oral Argument, Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., No. 00-836, 2000
WL 1763817, at *15. The Florida Attorney General (who was also an elector pledged to vote
for Gore) stated, during oral argument that "never before the present election had a manual
recount been conducted on the basis of the contention that 'undervotes' [ballots with no
punches on them] should have been examined to determine voter intent." Bush v. Gore, 531
U.S. 98, 120 (Dec. 12, 2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
34 Lund, supra note 7, at 1231.
35 Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v. Hams, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1283-84 (Fla. Dec.
11,2000).
36 1d. at 1284.
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Thus, in the view of a majority of the Florida Supreme Court, there is always
an "error in the vote tabulation" if a manual recount of ballots of a sample of the
precincts shows a difference between the machine tabulation and the human eye's
counting. The Florida Supreme Court did not explain why (given its interpretation
of the statute) the law bothered to require a second machine count: the statute (the
Florida Court told us) always requires a hand count in any close election. Voting
machines were invented because machines are not partisan, but the human eye is.
And, in any close election, the Florida court tells us that the partisan human eye
must make the final decision about what indentations on a ballot mean.
The Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute mandating hand
recounts, coupled with its refusal to define or articulate what standards the manual
voter counter is supposed to
use when counting, facilitated
the ability of a manual vote
counter to be partisan, because
all the manual counter is told is
that he or she is supposed to
discern the "clear indication of
the intent of the voter." This
non-test allows the manual
counters to determine the
voters' intention using
inconsistent standards.
For example, two counters
could pick up identical ballots,
look at them, and come up with
different conclusions. The
manual counter, of course, can
never interview the voter. One
might count an indentation near
the Gore punch (a quasi-punch,
where no light showed
through) as a vote for Mr. Gore. Reprinted wilh permission South Florida Sun-Sentinel.
Another might look at an identical ballot and determine that the indentation was
not a vote. The first counter might pick up an identical ballot and, this time,
interpret the indentation differently. Multiply this procedure by hundreds of
thousands of ballots that the machine did not read (because the voter did not
follow directions or did not want to punch any chad for that office) and you begin
to understand the procedure that the Florida Supreme Court created.
Even if every one of the counters acted honestly and consistently with
themselves and with one another, the procedure that the Florida Court created has
inherent problems. You can look at a ballot and claim that the voter really wanted
to vote for a candidate, but another person, with equal plausibility, can assert the
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voter (in casting an undervote or an overvote) really wanted to vote for none of
the above. If the manual counter asserts the voter wanted to vote for a candidate,
the counter then has to make a judgment as to which candidate, apparently based
on how close the indentation was to a particular candidate's name, or the direction
or depth of the indentation.
Reading the phrase, "the intent of the voter," to mean that the voter need not
follow the instructions to punch a hole next to the candidate's name really means
that the election instructions are simply advisory. For example, let us assume that
a voter picks up the ballot and marks nothing on it. He then gives it to the election
judge and says, "I know what the election instructions say, but I'm not following
them. I am telling you that I intend to vote this unmarked ballot for Governor
Bush; that is my intent." The majority of the Florida justices appear to say in their
ruling that this ballot must be counted for Bush, although it is an unmarked ballot.
In fact, their opinion appears to conclude that this intentionally blank ballot must
be counted because in this situation we expressly know the intentions of this
voter: he told us when he handed in the blank ballot. And, the intention of the
voter controls.
In this hypothetical, determining intent is easy because the voter told us her
intent when handing in the ballot. In reality, determining intent is much more
difficult, because one cannot cross-examine a piece of paper, and that is all that
the manual voter counter can "question." Even a mind-reader can only read
minds, not a piece of paper.
Nonetheless, the Florida Court ordered a hand recount of the 9000 ballots in
Miami-Dade County. It also determined that both Palm Beach County and
Miami-Dade County, in their earlier manual recounts, had identified a net gain of
215 legal votes (Palm Beach) and 168 legal votes (Miami-Dade) for Vice
President Gore.37 The Florida Supreme Court rejected the Circuit Court's
conclusion that Palm Beach County lacked the authority to include the 215 net
votes submitted past the November 26 deadline that the Florida Supreme Court
itself had earlier set because, the Florida Supreme Court now said, that its
deadline was not really intended to exclude votes identified after that date through
ongoing manual recounts. As to Miami-Dade County, the court concluded that
although the 168 votes identified were the result of a partial recount, they were
"legal votes [that] could change the outcome of the election," and so should be
counted. 38
The issue that came before the U.S. Supreme Court was twofold: (1) did the
Florida Supreme Court establish new standards for resolving presidential election
contests, thus violating Article II, Section 1, Clause 2, of the United States
Constitution and failing to comply with 3 U.S.C. § 5; and (2) did Florida's use of
standardless manual recounts, with no procedure for judicial review of disputed
37 Gore, 772 So. 2d at 1260 (Dec. 8, 2000).
3 81d.
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ballots and no uniform procedures for deciding what a ballot "meant," violate the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses? On December 11, 2000, the Supreme
Court, in a per curiam opinion, decided the second issue and found a violation of
equal protection and due process. The Court did not decide the first issue,
although a concurring opinion reached that question and found a violation there
too.3 9
IIl. WHAT THE FOUR JUSTICES ON THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT
ORDERED TO BE COUNTED MANUALLY
Now, with this general background, let us look more closely to what the
Florida Court actually ordered (four to three) on December 8.
First, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that Vice President Gore should be
credited by the net additional 215 votes that he had secured because Palm Beach
County had conducted a recount of all ballots (overvotes and undervotes). 40 Palm
Beach had not completed its recount by the deadline that the Florida Supreme
Court had earlier given it, but these four justices ruled that the earlier deadline did
not really matter.41 Nor was it important that Palm Beach, during the course of
the recount, had several times changed its standards for counting ballots and used
different standards than other counties.
Second, Miami-Dade County had started a manual recount of both overvotes
and undervotes of the entire county but never completed it. The election officials
(who were Democrats) did not choose randomly the precincts where they would
begin the manual recount. Instead, they cherry-picked and started counting only
in those precincts that had voted overwhelmingly for Gore.42 This partial recount
and geographic discrimination favored Gore because there was no manual
recount of the remaining precincts, including; those that had overwhelmingly
favored Bush, so Bush was denied the opportunity to pick up net votes from
ballots that were designated as overvotes. The four Florida justices announced
that Gore should be credited with the net gain of 168 votes for this biased sample:
the admittedly "partial recount" 43 of overvotes and undervotes only in those
precincts that had overwhelmingly voted for Gore.
39 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111-22 (Dec. 12, 2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
40 Gore, 772 So. 2d at 1248 (Dec. 8, 2000). Then-Governor Bush claimed that the audited
total was only 176 votes. The per curiam opinion, in the text, awards 215 votes to Vice
President Gore, but then, in a footnote, notes the dispute and directs the trial court to consider
the issue on remand. See id. at 1248 n.6, 1260 n. 19.
41 See id. at 1260.
42 See Siegel v. Lepore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1194-203 (11 th Cir. Dec. 6, 2000) (Cames, J.,
dissenting); see also Gore, 772 So. 2d at 1272 (Dec. 8, 2000) (Harding, J., dissenting, joined by
Shaw, J., and, on this point, by Wells, C.J.) (arguing that a partial recount is an "unfair
distortion of the statewide vote").
43 See Gore, 772 So. 2d at 1248, 1260 (Dec. 8, 2000).
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At this point, Governor Bush was only 537 votes ahead,44 so the fact that
these four Florida justices ordered that 383 votes be added to Vice President
Gore's total was significant.
There is another significant fact about these votes. The Florida Supreme
Court earlier had ordered that these votes be given to Gore, but the U.S. Supreme
Court decision had vacated that order. On November 21, 2000, the Florida
Supreme Court ruled that, for various reasons, the deadline and restrictions that
appeared to exist in Florida statutory law did not apply in this instance. On
December 4, 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously vacated this decision
and remanded for clarification,45 because (the U.S. Supreme Court said) this
Florida Supreme Court ruling, giving its unclear reasoning, may have violated
Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 or a federal statute.46 On December 8, 2000, when
the Florida court again awarded these 383 votes to Vice President Gore, it had not
yet clarified its earlier decision, which the Supreme Court had vacated. These
votes were not yet valid because the state court was awarding them based on its
earlier decision that the U.S. Supreme Court had vacated and not yet reinstated.
(In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court never reinstated it.)
Logically, how can the Florida Supreme Court add the votes from Miami-
Dade and the votes from Palm Beach before it clarified its earlier ruling? These
votes were still in dispute-they were still in play-because the Florida Supreme
Court had not answered the question that the U.S. Supreme Court had certified to
it. First, the Florida Supreme Court would have had to clarify its ruling pursuant
to the remand. Then, after it made that decision, the losing party (Governor Bush,
if the state court reaffirmed its earlier ruling using a different rationale) could seek
review before the U.S. Supreme Court. Until the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed or
denied review (or the time to seek review had passed) those votes could not be
validly added to Vice President Gore's totals. Four members of the Florida
Supreme Court just ignored the U.S. Supreme Court mandate and added those
disputed votes to the Gore column by ipse dixit, as if the U.S. Supreme Court had
44 Id. at 1247.
45 Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. Nov. 21, 2000)
(per curiam), vacated by Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 70 (Dec. 4, 2000) (per curiam) (Bush I).
46 The Court required the Florida Supreme Court to clarify its decision:
[W]e [the United States Supreme Court Justices] are unclear as to the extent to which the
Florida Supreme Court saw the Florida Constitution as circumscribing the legislature's
authority under Art. II, § 1, cl. 2 [the provision of the U.S. Constitution granting the
legislature of the state the authority to appoint electors in presidential and vice-presidential
elections]. We are also unclear as to the consideration the Florida Supreme Court accorded
to 3 U.S.C. § 5 [the statute providing a safe-harbor for the slate of state electors so long as
the contests were decided by a law enacted prior to the time when the electors were
chosen].
Bush, 531 U.S. at 73, 78 (Dec. 4, 2000).
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already affirmed the earlier decision, but that had not yet happened, and, in fact,
never happened.47
Third, these same four Florida justices ruled that there should be a manual
recount of approximately 9000 Miami-Dade ballots that the voting machines
earlier had counted and had registered as non-votes.48 These four justices did not
explain why the recount as to these ballots would be limited to undervotes, while
in other counties the recount (or the partial recount) included the overvotes. If the
purpose of the recount is to "count every vote" 49 and if one is able to discern the
"intent of the voter," then why limit the recount to undervotes? 50 And, if one
limits the recount to undervotes (thereby excluding the 110,000 overvotes
statewide), 51 why count only some overvotes in only some counties?
Fourth, these four justices ordered a statewide manual recount of all counties
that had not yet conducted a manual recount. Vice President Gore had limited his
47 On December 8, 2000, the Florida Supreme Court awarded Vice President Gore the
votes that were still in dispute from the opinion (Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd.,
531 U.S. 70 (Dec. 4, 2000)) that the U.S. Supreme Court had vacated. See Gore, 772 So. 2d at
1248 (Dec. 8, 2000). On December 9, 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court accepted certiorari in that
case and stayed the Florida Supreme Court's order. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (Dec. 9,
2000). This order also set the date for oral argument for December 11. On December 11, 2000,
three days after the Florida Supreme Court knew that the U.S. Supreme Court had stayed the
Florida Supreme Court decision, the Florida Supreme Court purported to answer the issues
raised by the December 4 ruling. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d
1273 (Fla. Dec. 11,2000) (per curiam). In that case, Chief Justice Wells dissented "from issuing
a new decision while the United States Supreme Court" considered Bush v. Gore, id. at 1292
(citation omitted), and he "[did] not concur in the reissued opinion." Id. at 1292 (citing the U.S.
Supreme Court stay order of December 9, 2000) (Wells, C.J., dissenting). The issue was no
longer relevant given the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling the day after this December 11 Florida
ruling.
48 See Gore, 772 So. 2d at 1262 (Dec. 8,2000).
49 The "count every vote" slogan is one that supporters of Vice President Gore articulated.
However, these supporters were not necessarily consistent. On November 15, a Gore campaign
lawyer circulated a memorandum providing a five-point guide to disqualifying military ballots
on various grounds, some quite technical. Ultimately, they were able to disqualify 788 military
absentee ballots. See Bob Zelnick, The Myth of a Stolen Election, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2001, at
Al8; cf Rowan Scarborough, Daschle Denies Blocking Bill on Military Voting, GOP Aides
Say Measure Is Being 'Held', WASH. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2000, at Al: "The office of Senate
Minority Leader Tom Daschle yesterday denied he is blocking a bill on military polling places
but could not guarantee that Democrats will let the measure come to a vote before the
congressional session ends in two weeks."
50 Justice Breyer said that he was not concerned that the recount of the remaining counties
would be limited to undervotes because "petitioners presented no evidence, to this Court or to
any Florida court, that a manual recount of overvotes would identify additional legal votes."
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 145 (Dec. 12, 2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting). This statement is
amazing because the Florida Supreme Court assigned "legal votes" to Vice President Gore that
came from overvotes! The manual recount had identified overvotes from the partial recounts.
51 See id. at 107, 108.
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recount request to three overwhelmingly democratic counties 52 and one other
small county that actually had equipment and software failures.53 These four
Florida justices now ordered a manual recount of all the other counties
(something no party ever requested) and then announced that the recount as to
these other counties would be limited to the undervote ballots while the other
counties were not so limited.54
IV. THE NUMBER OF JUSTICES WHO CONCLUDED THAT THE
FLORIDA SUPREME COURT'S RULING VIOLATED
EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS
On the night of December 12, 2001, when the Supreme Court released its
opinion, many pundits instantly claimed that the Court had divided five to four,
and that this division had been on political grounds.55 That claim is simply not
true. If we believe what the Justices said, on the constitutional question, the Court
ruled seven to two that Florida's recount violated equal protection and due
process because Florida's distinctions were-as Justice Souter said--"wholly
arbitrary."'56
Seven Justices-yes, seven, not five-agreed that what the Florida Supreme
Court was requiring violated these constitutional guarantees. We do not know
why Justices Souter and Breyer labeled their separate opinions as "dissenting"
opinions rather than opinions "concurring in part and dissenting in the
judgment, '57 but it is clear that both of these Justices concluded that the Florida
Supreme Court was ordering a recount that violated basic procedural and equal
protection guarantees found in the U.S. Constitution.
The five Justices who joined the per curiam opinion, and Justices Souter and
Breyer, believed that a system for manually recounting votes that had no
objective standards to guide the search for voter intent by different vote counters
52 See Siegel v. Lepore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1194 (11 th Cir. 2000) (Carnes, J., dissenting,
joined by Tjoflat, Birch, and Dubina, JJ.) Justice Cames argued that "the selective manual
recounts in some of the Florida counties that use the punch card system of voting violate the
equal protection rights of the voters in the other punch card system counties." Id.; see also id. at
1203-04 (counties chosen for recount because they were disproportionately pro-Gore).
53 See id. at 1196; see also id. at 1215-16 chart C (ranking the punch card counties by
percentage of"no vote" in the presidential race).
54 See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1253 (Fla. Dec. 8, 2000) (per curiam).
55 See Bush, 531 U.S. at 98 (Dec. 12, 2000); see also, e.g., Daniel Schorr, The Supreme
Fix Was In, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONrrOR, Dec. 15,2000, at 11.
56 Bush, 531 U.S. at 134 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer, J.).
57 All of the Justices were operating under tight deadlines. These two Justices did dissent
on the particular remedy and, perhaps, they wanted to emphasize that point. Or, it may just be
an error: when things are rushed, people act differently than they do when matters are more
calm.
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was totally arbitrary and that this disparate treatment of similarly cast votes was
not related to any legitimate governmental interest. Because the Court was
reviewing a government action that could severely impair a fundamental right
(the right to vote), the Court would not grant a presumption of constitutionality to
the system that the Florida court established. Rather, these seven Justices chose to
independently examine the standardless recount procedure to determine if it
would create arbitrary classifications and disparate treatment of similarly situated
voters. 58
Consider this statement from one of the Court's opinions: "I can conceive of
no legitimate state interest served by these differing treatments of the expressions
of voters' fundamental rights. The differences appear wholly arbitrary." 59 That
was Justice Souter speaking, joined by Justice Breyer. These two Justices (one
appointed by Republican President George Herbert Walker Bush, and the other
by Democratic President William Jefferson Clinton)60 agreed that the manual
recount violated basic equal protection and due process.
Souter went on to explain:
It is true that the Equal Protection Clause does not forbid the use of a variety of
voting mechanisms within a jurisdiction, even though different mechanisms will
have different levels of effectiveness in recording voters' intentions; local variety
can be justified by concerns about cost, the potential value of innovation, and so
on. But evidence in the record here suggests that a different order of disparity
obtains under rules for determining a voter's intent that have been applied (and
could continue to be applied) to identical types of ballots used in identical brands
of machines and exhibiting identical physical characteristics (such as "hanging"
or "dimpled" chads). (testimony of Palm Beach County Canvassing Board
Chairman Judge Charles Burton describing varying standards applied to
imperfectly punched ballots in Palm Beach County during precertification
manual recount); (similarly describing varying standards applied in Miami-Dade
County); (soliciting from county canvassing boards proposed protocols for
determining voters' intent but declining to provide a precise, uniform
standard).61
Justice Souter made no effort to mince words or otherwise moderate his
criticism of the Florida court: "I can conceive of no legitimate state interest served
58 See 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.31, at 51-70 (3d ed. Supp. 2002) (discussing the Equal
Protection Clause issues in the 2000 presidential election with respect to the right to vote).
59 Bush, 531 U.S. at 134 (Dec. 12, 2000) (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer, J.).
60 Yet, many critics of this decision appear to ignore the participation of Justices Breyer
and Souter. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note I I ("The Court's decision in Bush v. Gore... is all
too easily explainable as the decision by five conservative Republicans....").
61 Bush, 531 U.S. at 134 (Dec. 12, 2000) (Souter, J., dissenting joined by Breyer, J.)
(emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
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by these differing treatments of the expressions of voters' fundamental rights. The
differences appear wholly arbitrary."'62
Souter would not simply remand the case: he insisted that Florida first adopt
uniform standards to count the votes and "establish uniform standards for
evaluating the several types of ballots that have prompted differing treatments, to
be applied within and among counties when passing on such identical ballots in
any further recounting (or successive recounting) that the courts might order. '63
However, as discussed below, that proposed solution of creating uniform
standards raised another problem: If the Florida Supreme Court created new
standards after the election, it would be clear that they were changing the law,
because no standards existed before the election; there were no procedures to
determine when to count so-called "dimpled" chads, i.e., markings or indentations
that were near a candidate's name but did not comply with the state requirement
of a clean punch on a ballot.
And then there is the time problem. We know now that a recount would have
taken months; the various unofficial recounts that later occurred took many
months, and those recounts (because they were unofficial) required no court tests,
appeals, remands, and new appeals.64 A real recount would be accompanied by
court tests of the standards and court challenges to the implementation of those
standards, and judicial appeals up to, and perhaps including, the U.S. Supreme
Court.
Justice Breyer's separate opinion agreed that "basic principles of fairness
may well have counseled the adoption of a uniform standard to address the
problem."65 He too was not concerned about the lack of time to sort out and count
all the "undervotes," but he insisted on a "single-uniform standard" to be used
when recounting the votes. 66 Interestingly, not only Souter but also Stevens and
Ginsburg joined this part of Breyer's opinion. Hence, all nine Justices agreed that
there must be a "single-uniform standard" used to count the votes. For example,
there should be "a uniform determination whether indented, but not perforated,
'undervotes' should count. '67 During the December 11, 2000, oral argument in
Bush v. Gore, one of the Justices noted: "It was clear that Broward and Palm
Beach counties had applied different criteria to dimpled ballots. One of them was
62 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer, J.) (emphasis added) (internal citations
omitted).
63 Id. at 134-35 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer, J.).
64 In the case of the consortium of newspapers that included the Wall Street Journal, the
project took more than nine months. See Calmes & Foldessy, supra note 19. The Miami
Herald's recount team began counting the undervotes on December 18, 2000, and concluded
on March 13, 2001. See Merzer, supra note 19.
65 Bush, 531 U.S. at 146 (Dec. 12, 2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting joined by Souter, J.).
66 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, & Souter, JJ.).
67 Id. at 145 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Souter, J.).
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counting all dimpled ballots, the other one plainly was not."'68 Yet, this untidy fact
did not bother the four members of the Florida Supreme Court, which had refused
to create or articulate any single uniform standard.
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist
agreed that Florida's "standardless manual recounts" and the "recount
mechanisms implemented in response to the decisions of the Florida Supreme
Court do not satisfy the minimum requirement for nonarbitrary treatment of
voters necessary to secure the fundamental right."69 This per curiam opinion did
not object to Florida's basic leitmotif that the manual counter must consider the
"intent of the voter." 70 This mantra:
is unobjectionable as an abstract proposition and a starting principle. The
problem inheres in the absence of specific standards to ensure its equal
application. The formulation of uniform rules to determine intent based on these
recurring circumstances is practicable and, we conclude, necessary.71
As this per curiam opinion72 noted, the Florida ruling created other problems
as well, because the state court refused to articulate any process explaining the
procedure by which the votes are to be counted and objections are to be heard.
The Florida "order did not specify who would recount the ballots. The county
canvassing boards were forced to pull together ad hoc teams of judges from
various Circuits who had no previous training in handling and interpreting
ballots."73
Moreover, the Florida order specifically precluded judicial review of any
objections to the way any counter treated a ballot. "Furthermore, while others
were permitted to observe, they were prohibited from objecting during the
recount."'74 This restriction is amazing. If poll watchers representing either Vice
President Gore or Governor Bush objected when a manual vote-counter treated an
indentation on a ballot as a vote for a candidate, there was nothing that the poll
watchers could do. They would simply observe the possible violation of law and
then, apparently, sit on their hands and vegetate while the ballot was counted for a
candidate and then thrown into and mixed with a pile with the other ballots. Yet,
during oral argument, Mr. Boies, the lawyer for Vice President Gore, explicitly
68 Oral Argument at 55, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949), available at
http://election2000.stanford.edu/949trans.pdf.
69 Bush, 531 U.S. at 103, 105 (Dec. 12, 2000).
70 Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1262 (Fla. Dec. 8,2000) (per curiam).
71 Bush, 531 U.S. at 106 (Dec. 12,2000).
72 See generally Laura Krugman Ray, The Road to Bush v. Gore: The History of the
Supreme Court's Use of the Per Curiam Opinion, 79 NED. L. REv. 517, 517 (2000) (cataloging
the use of the per curiam opinion by the United States Supreme Court).
73 Bush, 531 U.S. at 109 (Dec. 12,2000).
74 Id. (emphasis added).
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conceded that one judge would have to make the initial final decision on all
disputed ballots, and this decision would be subject to appeal.75
There are those who claim that only conservative Republican-appointed
Justices ruled against Vice President Gore in this case.76 Not only is that claim
inconsistent with the position of Justices Breyer and Souter,77 it is inconsistent
with the position of three of the Florida justices who dissented. No justice on the
Florida Supreme Court was a Republican-appointee, but three of them concluded
that the recount that Vice President Gore wanted was unconstitutional. Three of
the seven Florida Supreme Court justices also found an equal protection violation
when the manual ballot-counters used different procedures to examine identical
ballots and count them differently: "Should a county canvassing board count or
not count a 'dimpled chad' where the voter is able to successfully dislodge the
chad in every other contest on that ballot? Here, the county canvassing boards
disagree. Apparently, some do and some do not."178
Chief Justice Wells, in his dissent, had warned that changing standards for
counting dimpled chads from county to county "is fraught with equal protection
concerns which will eventually cause the election results in Florida to be stricken
by the federal courts or Congress."79 That is, of course, what happened.80
75 The Justice said: "does not the procedure that is in place there contemplates [sic] that
the uniformity will be achieved by having the final results all reviewed by the samejudge?" Mr.
Boies responded:
Yes, that's what I was going to say, Your Honor, that what you have here is you have a
series of decisions that people get a right to object to is all going through a process, the
people are there. They submit written objections, and then that's going to be reviewed by a
court.
Oral Argument at 54, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949), available at
http://election2000.stanford.edu/949trans.pdf.
76 For example, Professor Alan Dershowitz argued that the decision was five to four and
the Justices in the majority "were appointed precisely because their biographies showed them to
be right-wing ideologues and Republican partisans." See Savage, supra note 6. The three
Florida justices who dissented (and the Florida trial judge whom the Florida Supreme Court
reversed) do not fit this profile.
77 The two Justices disagreeing with their seven colleagues were also bipartisan: Justice
Ginsburg, was appointed by President Clinton, and Justice Stevens, was appointed by President
Ford. They acted in good faith, like their colleagues, but concluded that the Court should defer
to the state court's interpretation of state law even when that interpretation implicated important
federal rights. However, when federal law incorporates state law by reference it also places
federal limitations as to what that state law might mean. See infra Part V.
78 Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1267 (Fla. Dec. 8, 2000) (Wells, C.J., dissenting); see
also id. at 1272-73 (Harding, J., dissenting, joined by Shaw, J., and, on this point, by Wells,
C.J.) (arguing that a partial recount is not acceptable because the standards set forth by the
majority would render the recount inaccurate).
79 Id. at 1267 (Wells, C.J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
2003]
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
During oral argument, Vice President Gore's lawyer acknowledged that "the
standards for accepting or rejecting contested ballots might vary not only from
county to county but indeed within a single county from one recount team to
another. '81 None of this appeared to bother Vice President's Gore's lawyers, who
argued before the U.S. Supreme Court that it was proper for some counties to
manually count both overvotes and undervotes, while other counties did not do
so. Indeed, they argued that it was proper for a county to apply different rules for
manually counting during the course of the count. 82 Indeed, Gore's lawyer argued
during oral argument that the rules for a valid vote could "vary from individual to
individual."'83
So, within the same county, two ballots could have identical indentations and
one would count as a vote and the other one would not, simply because the
standard changed during the course of the counting. Yet, it is basic equal
protection law that we must treat votes equally, and not count some more than
others because of arbitrary reasons, such as where a vote was cast in a state-wide
election.84 Nearly a third of a century earlier, the Supreme Court held, in another
case, that a voting system that dilutes the votes of the voters in one county
80 In fact, there is evidence that even the dissenters on the U.S. Supreme Court did not
really dispute that there was an equal protection violation. First, Justice Stevens. "Admittedly,"
he said, "the use of differing substandards for determining voter intent in different counties
employing similar voting systems may raise serious concerns ... " but we should "allow[] a
little play in its joints." Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 126 (Dec. 12, 2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting,
joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ.) (quoting Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499, 501
(1931)). "Even assuming that aspects of the remedial scheme might ultimately be found to
violate the Equal Protection Clause, I could not subscribe to the majority's disposition .... Id.
(Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ.).
Justice Ginsburg's defense of the Florida recount was hardly enthusiastic, for she referred
to it as: "flawed as it may be." Id. at 143 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, J.).
Remember, that comes from someone who was defending the four-person majority of the
Florida court. She argued that the flawed recount would be no worse than the certification that
preceded it. But it is not a ringing endorsement of the Florida Supreme Court to say that its
decision was no worse than its earlier decision, because the U.S. Supreme Court had earlier
unanimously reversed and remanded that decision. Like Justice Stevens, she did not believe that
time was of the essence. and would grant no deference to Florida's decision that it wanted to
take advantage of the federal safe harbor by certifying a winner by December 12, 2000.
81 Id. at 106.
82 See id. at 106-07.
83 Oral Argument at 50, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949), available at
http://election2000.stanford.edu/949trans.pdf.
84 See, e.g., Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 378-79 (1963) (holding that the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits the state from giving more weight to voters from county to county);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567-68 (1964) (determining that "an individual's right to vote
for state legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion
diluted when compared with the votes of citizens living in other parts of the State").
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compared to the voters of another county violates equal protection.85 Once a state
grants the vote, it may not "by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one
person's vote over that of another.18 6
But the Florida procedures allowed identical ballots to be treated differently,
valuing one person's vote differently than another person's ballot. In addition, by
counting all overvotes and undervotes in some counties (or parts of some
counties) and only undervotes in other counties, the Florida Court was skewing
the election results by favoring some counties over others. Nearly four decades
ago, the Court held that "the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or
dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly
prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise." 87
The Attorney General of Florida, who was not merely a Gore supporter but
ran in Florida as a Gore presidential elector, warned of the serious equal
protection problems that exist by Florida "treating voters differently, depending
upon what county they voted in." 88 He said: "I feel a duty to warn that if the final
certified total for balloting in the State of Florida includes figures generated from
this two-tier system of differing behavior by official canvassing boards, the State
will incur a legal jeopardy, under both the U.S. and State constitutions."89 Despite
this warning, the Florida Supreme Court ordered this two-tier system of counting.
85 See Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 818-19 (1969); see also O'Brien v. Skinner, 414
U.S. 524, 531 (1974). In O'Brien, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, held that New
York statutes, construed as denying to persons detained within counties of their residence
absentee registration or voting, while granting these rights to persons similarly detained outside
counties of their residence, were arbitrary, imposed an unconstitutionally onerous burdens on
exercise of franchise, and denied equal protection. See O'Brien, 414 U.S. at 531.
86 Bush, 531 U.S. at 104-05 (Dec. 12, 2000) (citing Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663,665 (1966)).
87 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555.
88 Letter from Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, to Hon. Charles E. Burton, Chair,
Palm Beach Canvassing Board 14 (Nov. 14, 2000), in Appendix to Brief of Intervenors Glenda
Carr et al., Bush v. Gore, No. 00-949 (00A504), at 14, available at
http://election2000.stanford.edu/respcarr.949.pdf.
89 The Florida Attorney General's letter states in part:
If hand recounts have already occurred in Seminole County and an unknown number of
other counties without the restraint of a legal opinion while similar hand counts are
blocked in other counties due to a newly issued standard, a two-tier system for reporting
votes results.
A two-tier system would have the effect of treating voters differently, depending upon
what county they voted in. A voter in a county where a manual recount was conducted
would benefit from having a better chance of having his or her vote actually counted than a
voter in a county where a hand count was halted.
As the State's chief legal officer, I feel a duty to warn that if the final certified total for
balloting in the State of Florida includes figures generated from this two-tier system of
differing behavior by official canvassing boards, the State will incur a legal jeopardy,
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This violation of equal protection exists even if the human beings who are
doing the hand-count are non-partisan, completely objective, never make a
mistake, and are always consistent. In fact, we know that they are not.90 For
example, even before the selective hand recount, Palm Beach County had
certified 800 more votes than its precinct-by-precinct canvas reported on election
night.91
On election night, Governor Bush had a 1784 vote lead over Vice President
Gore, but after the machine recount, that margin went down to 327 votes. How
did that happen? A University of Nevada professor calculated that the chance that
Vice President Gore would have increased his Florida vote total as much as he
did was forty-three million to one.92 How did Vice President Gore beat the odds?
We may never know the full story. One thing we know now is that, when the
ballots were recounted by machine, Pinellas County (a Gore stronghold) showed
an extra 417 votes for Gore. How can that be? It turns out that the very-human
election officials decided to help things along by altering the ballots before they
were resubmitted to the machine. They removed., from many ballots, the chad (the
little piece of paper the voter is supposed to push through the computer ballot) by
hand thus giving Vice President Gore an extra 417 votes. As far as we know, no
other Florida county (including the counties that voted disproportionately for
Governor Bush) did that. The election officials treated the Gore ballots (that is,
ballots much more likely to be in the Gore camp) differently from the Bush
ballots were treated in other counties, where the election officials were not so
helpful. 93
under both the US. and State constitutions. This legal! jeopardy could potentially lead to
Florida having all of its votes, in effect, disqualified and this state being barred from the
Electoral College's selection of a president.
Id. (emphasis added).
90 The various newspapers hired a respected nonpartisan group to count manually the
ballots. These counters were supposed to be impartial. However, the "Republican counters were
4% more likely than Democratic counters to deny a mark was for Gore. Even more striking,
Democrats were 25% more likely to deny a mark was for Bush. This bias may well be utterly
unconscious, but it remains a problem for any manual recount process." Elhauge, supra note
23, at 29.
91 See John H. Fund, The People Have Spoken; Will Gore Listen?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10,
2000, at A 18.
92 See Jace Radke, Statistics Point to More Than Random Error in Florida Vote, LAS
VEGAS SUN, Nov. 10, 2000, at http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/archives/2000/nov/
10/511018638.html.
93 "In Pinellas County, when election officials removed the chaff from ballots before they
were submitted for recount by the machines, Gore picked up an additional 417 votes." Richard
Lacayo, In the Eye of the Storm, TIME.COM, Nov. 12, 2000, at http://www.time.com/time/
campaign2000/story/0,7243,87787,00.html.
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V. CHANGING THE STATE LAW AFMER THE ELECTION
Three of these seven Justices in Bush v. Gore,94 wrote a separate concurring
opinion, and discussed a ground that the other Justices did not reach. The question
was whether the Florida Supreme Court was merely "interpreting" the relevant
statutes or really "making" new law after the election. This is not a situation
where Governor Bush complained that the rules were changed in the middle of
the game; instead, the charge is that the Florida Supreme Court was trying to
change the rules of the game after the game-after the last inning had been ended
and the players (the voters) had gone home.
While some commentators (and the respondent in this case) focused on the
metaphysical question whether judges ever "make law," or "find law" in the
brooding omnipresence of the common law or in the jurisprudential ether,95 that
academic distinction is besides the point, because Supreme Court precedent going
back many years supports the right of federal courts to reject a state court's
purported interpretation of state law when that interpretation is not an adequate
and independent state ground, when the state court's interpretation of its own
statutes is not reasonably foreseeable, and is not reasonably anticipated from the
prior case law.
For example, the Constitution provides that states may not "impair[] the
Obligation of Contracts."'96 What constitutes an "impairment" is a matter of
federal law, but the definition of a "contract" is primarily, but not completely, a
state-law question. The federal law incorporates by reference the state court's
interpretation, but that state court ruling is subject to a federal interpretation to
make sure that the state court does not evade federal constitutional requirements.
Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's decision in Indiana ex rel.
Anderson v. Brand.97 Petitioner sued to keep her job as a public school teacher.
Her contract for previous years had contained a clause incorporating the state's
Teachers' Tenure Law, and she claimed that, by virtue of that act, she had a
contract indefinite in duration that could be canceled only for specific causes. The
state supreme court rejected that argument because it concluded that the
Teachers' Tenure Law had been repealed as to teachers in township schools and
the repeal did not deprive the teacher of any vested property right nor impair the
obligation of contracts. In other words, the state court argued that she had no
94 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111-22 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring, joined by Scalia
and Thomas, JJ.).
95 The "ether" was the medium that pre-modem, medieval scientists once supposed to fill
all space (because "nature abhors a vacuum"); this ether was supposed to support the
propagation of electromagnetic waves.
96 U.S. CONST, art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
97 303 U.S. 95 (1938).
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contract within the meaning of state law and, there not being any contract, there
could be no impairment.
The U.S. Supreme Court first concluded that it had the right to reject the state
court's interpretation of state law: "[W]e are bound to decide for ourselves" the
nature of the contract, "in order that the constitutional mandate may not become a
dead letter.' '98 The Court then concluded-after its own "appraisal of the statutes
of the State and the decisions of its courts" 99-that it would not accept the state
court's decision that there was no contract (and hence no impairment) because
that decision was neither fairly grounded in, nor fairly anticipated from, the prior
case law.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Brand clearly rejected the state court's
interpretation of its own state statute. The language is worth quoting at length:
As in most cases brought to this court under the contract clause of the
Constitution, the question is as to the existence and nature of the contract and not
as to the construction of the law which is supposed to impair it.... On such a
question, one primarily of state law, we accord respectful consideration and great
weight to the views of the State's highest court but, in order that the
constitutional mandate may not become a dead letter, we are bound to decide for
ourselves whether a contract was made, what are its terms and conditions, and
whether the State has, by later legislation, impaired its obligation. This involves
an appraisal of the statutes of the State and the decisions of its courts.... [W]e
are of the opinion that the petitioner had a valid contract with the respondent, the
obligation of which would be impaired by the termination of her
employment.... The state courts in earlier cases so declared. The title of the act
is couched in of contract.100
The Court then discussed in detail various state cases (including lower state court
decisions, even one case going back to 1873),101 as well as the language of
various state statutes. The Court disagreed with the state court on the meaning of
state law, and then reversed and remanded.10 2
98 Id. at 100; see also, e.g., Phelps v. Bd. of Educ.,, 300 U.S. 319, 322-23 (1937) (noting
that the Court "is not bound by the decision of a state court as to the existence and terms of a
contract").
99 Brand, 303 U.S. at 100.100 Id. at 100, 104-05 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted); see also I ROTUNDA &
NOWAK, supra note 58, § 2.14(b), at 286-87 (discussing, the Brand decision and the "adequate
and independent state ground" doctrine).
101 See Brand, 303 U.S. at 100 n.10.
102 See also, e.g., Terre Haute & I.R. Co. v. Indiana ex rel. Ketcham, 194 U.S. 579, 589
(1904), where the Court rejected the state court's interpretation ("untenable construction') of a
corporate charter instead of the state's construction of a state statute. It would make no sense to
make a distinction between the two because to "hold otherwise would open an easy method of
avoiding the jurisdiction of this court." Id.
[Vol. 64:283
YET ANOTHER ARTICLE ON BUSH V. GORE
Oddly enough, no Justice cited Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, although
the case is certainly on point. Brand made clear that the Supreme Court need not
defer to a state's interpretation of state law when that interpretation does not
appear to be fairly grounded in the prior precedent. Perhaps no Justice cited this
case because no lower court, and no brief of any party or amicus, cited it. The
state and federal cases were written with dispatch, given the desire of all parties
for prompt decision, and that may explain this omission. Yet even without
knowledge of this case, the Justices knew that it was important whether the state
court had changed the law when it reversed the trial courts.
Did the Florida Supreme Court change the law? When Palm Beach County
determined to conduct a manual recount, it was concerned that the recount could
not be completed prior to a deadline set forth in a Florida statute requiring all
county returns to be certified by the seventh day after an election. So, it sought,
from the Division of Elections, an advisory opinion allowing it to count past the
deadline. The Division refused to extend this deadline, and Florida Secretary of
State Katherine Harris relied on it when she issued a statement confirming the
statutory deadline. Various Florida counties unsuccessfully sued, on behalf of
Vice President Gore, in an effort to require the Secretary of State not to comply
with the statutory deadline. 103 When the Secretary announced that she was going
to certify the returns and comply with the deadline, Vice President Gore and
others sued again, seeking to compel the Secretary to accept returns amended
after the deadline. On November 17, 2000, the lower court once again denied the
relief.104
At this point, Bush's vote totals were growing, because the absentee ballots
were being counted, and they disproportionately favored the Governor. The mood
among the Gore lawyers was "extremely glum."' 1 5 Then, on November 17, 2000,
the Florida Supreme Court, on its own motion, enjoined the Secretary of State
from certifying the results of the election.' 0 6 The Gore lawyers had not asked for
this emergency stay, for there was no basis in state law for giving it sua sponte,
103 See McDermott v. Harris, No. 00-2700, 2000 WL 1693713, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov.
14, 2000), cited in, Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1280 n.4
(Fla. Dec. 11, 2000).
104 See McDermott v. Harris, No. 00-2700, 2000 WL 1714590, at *I (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov.
17,2000).
105 David Von Drehle et al., Deadlock: A "Queen" Kept Clock Running, WASH. POST,
Jan. 30, 2001, at Al.
106 See Stay Order, Nov. 17, 2001, Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So.
2d 1273 (Fla. 2000), available at http://election2000.stanford.edu/stay.pdf. The order said: "In
order to maintain the status quo, the Court, on its own motion, enjoins the Respondent,
Secretary of State and Respondent, the Elections Canvassing Commission from certifying the
results of the November 7, 2000, presidential election, until further order of this Court." Id. at 1.
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and yet the Florida Supreme Court was taking the case "out of nowhere."'107 The
Gore legal team gave a "whoop and a cheer."108
This surprising order, giving Vice President Gore something that he did not
request, may have marked the beginning of what looked like the Florida Supreme
Court creating new law. We do know that, as the Vice President's lawyers later
acknowledged, even with this victory, "the end.-game strategy for the Gore team
was political, not legal."' 109
Later, on November 17, 2000, the Florida Supreme Court scheduled its oral
argument for November 20.110 On that day, the lawyers preparing for the oral
argument learned, from a "knowledgeable source close to the Florida high
court," I I1 that the Florida justices had already decided the case in favor of Gore,
had already drafted the opinion, and had decided to mandate a recount and extend
the deadline for five days. The next day, the Bush lawyers argued the case and the
justices acted "as if their minds were still open."1 12
We know that the decision that the court issued later that day marked the first
time that Florida ever had a manual recount "for anything other than arithmetic
tabulation error. This is something that is unprecedented in the State of
Florida."' 13
Consider this moment in the oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court. It
was one of the most significant moments, and it came when Justice Scalia asked
Paul Hancock, the attorney for the Florida Attorney General's Office, if he knew
of any "elections in Florida in which recounts were conducted, manual recounts,
because of an allegation that some voters did not punch the cards the way they
should have through their fault? No problem with the machinery-it's working
fine. You know, there were what, pregnant chads, hanging chads, so forth?"1 14
107 Von Drehle et al., supra note 105.
108 Id.
109 Todd J. Zywicki, The Law of Presidential Transitions and the 2000 Election, 2001
BYU L. REV. 1573, 1588-89 n.45. A year after the 2000 election, in November 2001, Ron
Klain, the general counsel of the Gore recount team "acknowledged that the litigation would
not have affected Congress's power to recognize the Bush certificate and that the end-game
strategy for the Gore team was political, not legal. Gore hoped that if he won the recount he
sought, Bush would concede the election notwithstanding his legal advantages." Id.
110 Order Accepting Jurisdiction, Setting Oral Argument and Setting Briefing Schedule,
Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, No. 00-2346, Nov. 17, 2000, available at http://
election2000.stanford.edu/schedule.pdf.
111 Von Drehle et al., supra note 105.
112 Id.
113 Oral Argument at 22, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949), available at
http://election2000.stanford.edu/949trans.pdf (remarks of'Theodore B. Olson).
114 Oral Argument, Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. (No. 00-836), 2000 WL
1763666, at *40 (Dec. 1,2000).
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The complete response: "No, Justice."' " Then Justice Scalia asked again:
"Did it ever happen?" Again, the unqualified answer: "No, I'm not aware of it
ever happening before." I 16 The Florida trial judges were also unaware that the
law should be interpreted to count pregnant chads or dents in the voting cards. In
the two Florida Supreme Court cases, the Florida court overruled both trial court
judges, who were applying the law as it existed at the time, before they were both
reversed by the Florida Supreme Court. This, again, looks like a change in the
prior law.
The attorney representing the Florida Attorney General also confirmed in oral
argument that never before the present election had a manual recount been
conducted on the basis of the contention that undervotes should have been
examined to determine voter intent.1 17 Again, this looks like a change in the prior
law.
Case law before the 2000 election had ruled that there must be no recount
simply because of a failure of the machinery to count ballots with "hanging paper
chads." 18 Recall that in both Florida Supreme Court decisions the Florida Court
has to overrule two different trial courts, because those judges as well did not
anticipate that manual counters could accept ballots with hanging paper chads or
ballots with not even hanging chads but merely a dimpled chad.
The Florida Supreme Court "changed" the law governing the counting of
ballots in the same way that the Indiana Supreme Court had changed the law. In
both cases, the new law was not fairly anticipated from the prior case law. And
that change violated the federal statute that forbids post-election changes in
election law."l 9 The federal statute refers to "law" and not "statute '1 20 because it
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 See id. at *39-40.
118 Broward County Canvassing Bd. v. Hogan, 607 So. 2d 508, 509 (Fla. Ct. App. 1992)
(per curiam). In the first election, the appellee won by three votes (1019 to 1016 votes). After
the machine recount, appellee lost by five votes (1019 to 1014 votes): "The minutes of the
hearing reveal that appellee stated that he wanted a recount because of the closeness of the
election and the differences between the two machine counts." Id. at 509. Even though only five
votes separated the winner from the loser, the Florida appellate court denied the manual recount
and reversed the lower court although the loser had blamed voter errors in piercing the chads:
All that should have been considered by the lower court was whether appellant failed to
perform some mandatory statutory act or whether there were any electoral improprieties
which had, not possibly might have, an influence on the ultimate choice of the voters.
Appellant acted within its discretion in this case; and the trial court erred in reversing the
initial denial of the manual recount request made by appellee.
Id. at 510. In that case there were fifty-eight overvotes and forty-two undervotes, more than
enough to change the results.
119 3 U.S.C. §§ 1-10 (2000).
120 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000).
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would make little sense to say that the state legislature cannot change the prior
law but the state supreme court had carte blanche. In order that the statutory and
constitutional mandate "may not become a dead letter, we are bound to decide for
ourselves" whether the election law was changed after the election. 12 1
Florida law empowers the Secretary of State to issue binding interpretations
of election law,122 and prior Florida case law required the Florida Supreme Court
to defer to the Secretary's interpretation. 123 The Secretary determined that the
election law did not require the counting of ballots that did not follow the plain
instructions, when the voting machines performed exactly as they were designed
to perform.124 The Florida Supreme Court, however, simply did not defer to the
Secretary's interpretation of the election code and instead required, in this
instance, a recount even though the voting machines were working exactly as they
have been designed to work. In other words, in every election, voting machines
regularly will not count overvotes and undervotes, which are simply another
name for ballots that do not comply with the instructions. Prior elections did not
demand a manual recount in this circumstance, 125 but the Florida court treated
this election differently.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion, after canvassing the prior state
law, concluded that the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of what was a
"legal vote" was not well-grounded in the prior law. Indeed, the Florida Supreme
Court required that illegal votes-votes that did not comply with the statutory
requirements-must be counted as "legal votes." The instructions prominently
displayed in each polling place and personally given to each voter in all capital
letters, provided:
AFTER VOTING, CHECK YOUR BALLOT CARD TO BE SURE YOUR
VOTING SELECTIONS ARE CLEARLY AND CLEANLY PUNCHED AND
THERE ARE NO CHIPS LEFT HANGING ON THE BACK OF THE
CARD. 12 6
121 Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100(1938).
122 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 97.012, 106.23 (West 2002).
123 Krivanek v. Take Back Tampa Political Comm., 625 So. 2d 840, 844-45 (Fla. 1993):
"We acknowledge that election laws should generally be liberally construed in favor of an
elector. However, the judgment of officials duly charged with carrying out the election process
should be presumed correct if reasonable and not in derogation of the law." (citations omitted).
124 Opinion of the Florida Department of State, Division of Elections, (No. 00-13), cited
in Bush, 531 U.S. 98, 119 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
125 Broward County Canvassing Bd. v. Hogan, 607 So. 2d 508, 509 (Fla. Ct. App. 1992)
(per curiam) (three to five vote difference with machine recount; no manual recount of ballots
with hanging chads).
126 Bush, 531 U.S. at 119 (Dec. 12,2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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The Florida Supreme Court, however, stepped away from the prior practice, the
prior case law, and the prior rulings.
Later the Florida Supreme Court itself acknowledged, by way of dictum, that
it should not create a new standard for counting votes-that the job of doing that
belonged to the legislature. "[U]pon reflection, we conclude that the development
of a specific, uniform standard necessary to ensure equal application and to secure
the fundamental right to vote throughout the State of Florida should be left to the
body we believe best equipped .... ,"127
This acknowledgment by the Florida Supreme Court is interesting. In a sense,
the dissent in the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged this problem as well. Justice
Breyer's separate opinion speculated that the Florida Supreme Court may have
been reluctant to adopt a specific standard because it feared that it would exceed
its authority under Article IH. But then, he appears to say that in "these very
special circumstances" the court should have been allowed to adopt "a uniform
standard to address the problem. ' 128 Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Souter on this point, argued that, "even at this late date," the U.S.
Supreme Court should give "instructions" to the Florida Supreme Court that it
should create "a single-uniform substandard," 129 presumably without worrying
about requirements of Article 11130 and a related federal statute requiring that the
state's electors must be chosen by laws that exist prior to the election in order for
the state to be assured that its electoral votes will count.1 31 Justice Breyer also
seemed to place no weight on the Florida Supreme Court's repeated statements
that it wanted the recount completed by December 12.132
One can read this paragraph by Justice Breyer as suggesting that the Court
should allow the Florida Supreme Court to change the election law by creating
new standards and not treat that as precedent in "these very special
circumstances."
The majority in Bush v. Gore does not accept the notion that it should create a
ruling without precedent. The majority does say that it is only deciding the issue
presented-whether the Florida Supreme Court's procedures for conducting the
recount violate equal protection. The Court tells us that its ruling is limited to this
issue: "Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem
127 Gore v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 524, 526 (Fla. Dec. 22, 2000) (per curiam).
128 Bush, 531 U.S. at 146 (Dec. 12, 2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Souter, J.)
(Part I.A.1).
129 Bush, 531 U.S. at 146 (Dec, 12, 2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens,
Ginsburg, & Souter, JJ.) (Part I.A.2).
130 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
131 See 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000).
132 See infra Part VI.
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of equal protection in election processes generally presents many
complexities."133
Critics of this decision have argued that this language means that the
Supreme Court was telling us that it was making a unique decision, and that this
case is not precedent.' 34 The majority was not saying that this case is not
precedent. Not even the dissent made that claim. A fair reading of the quoted
language simply states that the Court is not deciding an issue that is not part of
this case-whether a state can use different types of voting mechanisms in
different parts of the state when electing someone to a state-wide office (e.g.,
punch cards in some counties, optical character readers in other counties).
Justice Souter, by the way, does decide the issue that the majority avoids. He
says:
It is true that the Equal Protection Clause does not forbid the use of a variety of
voting mechanisms within a jurisdiction, even though different mechanisms will
have different levels of effectiveness in recording voters' intentions; local variety
can be justified by concerns about cost, the potential value of innovation, and so
on.1
3 5
Whether one agrees with the majority's decision to not reach this question, or
Justice Souter's decision to decide the question is not really the issue. The point is
that not even the dissent accuses the majority of trying to treat the case as if it is
not precedent. And Justice Souter (along with Justice Breyer and the five Justices
in the per curiam opinion in creating that precedent) agrees that when conducting
a recount of a statewide election, the manual counters must use the same
standards throughout the state.
VI. THE REMEDY
The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately concluded (1) that the recount could not
be completed by December 12, 2000, and (2) that the Florida Supreme Court had
already decided, as a matter of state law, that the legislature wanted all recounts to
be completed by December 12. Because critics of this decision focus on these two
issues, it is worthwhile to quote the relevant language at length.
A. The Procedures for a Valid Recount
First, what must be done before there can be a valid recount that treats ballots
equally and that is run according to fair, consistent procedures:
133 Bush, 531 U.S. at 109 (Dec. 12,2000).
134 See, e.g., Pamela Karlan, When Freedom Isn't Free: The Costs of Judicial
Independence in Bush v. Gore, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 265 (2003).
135 Bush, 531 U.S. at 134 (Dec. 12, 2000) (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer, J.).
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[T]he recount cannot be conducted in compliance with the requirements of equal
protection and due process without substantial additional work. It would require
not only the adoption (after opportunity for argument) of adequate statewide
standards for determining what is a legal vote, and practicable procedures to
implement them, but also orderly judicial review of any disputed matters that
might arise. In addition, the [Florida] Secretary [of State] has advised that the
recount of only a portion of the ballots requires that the vote tabulation
equipment be used to screen out undervotes, a function for which the machines
were not designed. If a recount of overvotes were also required, perhaps even a
second screening would be necessary. Use of the equipment for this purpose, and
any new software developed for it, would have to be evaluated for accuracy by
the Secretary, as required by [a Florida statute]. 136
B. When Must the Recount Be Completed
If that could be done, the next question is whether it must be completed by
December 12. Here is what the majority said:
The Supreme Court of Florida has said that the legislature intended the
State's electors to "participat[e] fully in the federal electoral process," as
provided in 3 U.S.C. § 5. 772 So. 2d, at 1289; see also Palm Beach County
Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1237 (Fla. 2000). That statute, in
turn, requires that any controversy or contest that is designed to lead to a
conclusive selection of electors be completed by December 12. That date is upon
us, and there is no recount procedure in place under the State Supreme Court's
order that comports with minimal constitutional standards. Because it is evident
that any recount seeking to meet the December 12 date will be unconstitutional
for the reasons we have discussed, we reverse the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Florida ordering a recount to proceed.137
Was the Court correct when it said that December 12, 2000, is the date that the
Florida Supreme Court had earlier decided was the date any recount must be
completed under Florida law?
In the first citation to which the U.S. Supreme Court refers, the Florida Court
said, on December 11, 2000: "[Iln this case involving a presidential election," the
decision to accept amended election returns (the manual recount) because of the
press of time, must take into account "the deadlines set forth in 3 U.S.C. § 5."138
That statute requires the certification of the voting to be completed at least six
days before the presidential electors vote. The electors vote on December 18, so
the Florida Court was simply telling us that the recount must be completed by
136 Id. at 110 (per curiam) (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.015 (West 2002)).
137 Id.
138 Palm Beach City Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1289 (Fla. Dec. 11,
2000) (per curiam).
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December 12.139 The U.S. Supreme Court accepted that state court interpretation
of its own law. The Florida Court repeated this admonition several times in this
November 21 decision. 140
The second citation is yet another instance when the state court cited the
federal statute assuring states that their electoral votes would be counted if all
election challenges were completed by December 12. The Florida Supreme Court
concluded that Florida statutory law intends to take advantage of that safe harbor
by completing any recounts by that date.' 4 1
Later, in its December 8 opinion, the Florida justices repeated the need to
comply with the December 12 deadline: "Of course, because the selection and
participation of Florida's electors in the presidential election process is subject to
a stringent calendar controlled by federal law, the Florida election law scheme
must yield in the event of a.conflic 't."142
Later, on December 11, 2000, the day before the U.S. Supreme Court issued
its ruling, the Florida justices repeated their statement that what is a "reasonable
time" is different in presidential elections because "the determination of
reasonableness must be circumscribed by the provisions of 3 U.S.C. § 5, which
sets December 12, 2000, as the date for final determination of any state's dispute
concerning its electors."'143 The Florida Court repeats this deadline later in the
same opinion. 144 If repetition were analogous to talking loudly, the Florida Court
would be screaming the deadline by now.
139 The Florida Court said:
Therefore, in this case involving a presidential election, we conclude that the reasoned
basis for the exercise of the Department's discretion to ignore amended returns is limited
to those instances where failure to ignore the amended returns .., in the case of a federal
election, will result in Florida voters not participating fhlly in the federal electoral process,
as provided in 3 U.S.C. § 5.
Id.
140 See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1237, 1239,
1239-40 (Fla. Nov. 21, 2000) (per curiam).
141 "Ignoring the county's returns is a drastic measure and is appropriate only if the
returns are submitted to the Department so late that their inclusion will compromise the
integrity of the electoral process ... by precluding Florida voters from participating fully in the
federal electoral process." See id. at 1237 (citing 3 U.S.C. §§ 1-10 (1994)) (footnote omitted).
142 Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1254 n. I I (Fla. Dec. 8, 2000) (per curiam).
143 Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 772 So. 2d at 1286 n. 17 (Dec. 11,2000); see also
Gary C. Leedes, The Presidential Election Case: Remembering Safe Harbor Day, 35 U. RICH.
L. REv. 237, 305-08 (2001) (maintaining that the Florida Supreme Court was acutely aware of
the safe harbor provision codified in 3 U.S.C. § 5 and Florida's obligation to comply with its
deadline of December 12).
144 See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 772 So. 2d at 1290 n.22 (Dec. 11, 2000).
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Indeed, by December 8, 2000, the Florida Supreme Court agreed that "all of
the parties agree that election controversies and contests must be finally and
conclusively determined by December 12, 2000."145
Chief Justice Wells elaborated on this issue in his dissent: "The safe harbor
deadline day is December 12, 2000. Today is Friday, Dec. 8, 2000. Thus, under
the majority's time line, all manual recounts must be completed in five days,
assuming the counting begins today."'146 None of his colleagues in the majority
contested this statement; instead, they endorsed it, and emphasized that they had
already held, in their earlier decision of November 21, 2000,147 that "all returns
must be considered unless their filing would ... endanger the counting of
Florida's electors in the presidential election." 148
On December 22, 2000, the Florida Supreme Court spoke once again, on the
remand from the case from the U.S. Supreme Court. If the Florida Court had
thought that state law did not intend December 12 to be the deadline for
concluding election contests for choosing presidential electors, the Florida Court
might have mentioned it. Instead, it simply acknowledged that a manual recount
could not be completed by that date, and that, "upon reflection," the legislature
should develop a uniform standard to "ensure equal application" of the law.149
Justice Shaw, concurring, did argue that, in his opinion, "December 12 was not a
'drop-dead' date under Florida law."' 50 He thought the drop-dead date was
January 6, 2001. But-and this is the significant point-not one other Florida
justice joined that opinion, nor embraced this belated argument. Of course, even if
one accepted January 6, no one could complete a manual recount, with
opportunity for judicial redress, by that date either.
Given Florida's repeated statements in various judicial opinions that the
Florida legislature wanted to take advantage of a federal statute that required all
recounts to be completed by December 12, the U.S. Supreme Court accepted
what the state court had earlier ruled.
Justices Souter and Breyer were willing to extend the recount until December
18, but only if the Florida court established new procedures to cure the
constitutional violations in the earlier recount that the U.S. Supreme Court had
145 Gore, 772 So. 2d at 1272 (Dec. 8, 2000) (per curiam) (Harding, J., dissenting, joined
by Shaw, J. and on this point by Wells, C.J.). No member of the majority in this case disputed
this statement by Justice Harding.
146 Id. at 1268 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
147 See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1237 n.55 (Fla.
Nov. 21, 2000) (citing 3 U.S.C. §§ 1-10 (1994)).
148 Gore, 772 So. 2d at 1260 (Dec. 8, 2000).
149 Gore v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 524, 526 (Fla. Dec. 22, 2000) (per curiam).
150 Id. at 528 (Shaw, J., concurring). One other justice did suggest that Congress might
wish to consider if a thirty-five day time limit for final resolution of a presidential election
contest is "realistic or reasonable." Id. at 530 n. 14 (Pariente, J., concurring).
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stopped. 15 1 It was on the remedy that these two Justices disagreed, but one could
not have complied with this remedy, even by December 18-six days after the
time that the state court had said was the final deadline-if there would be judicial
review of the validity of the new procedures, a manual recount of millions of
votes, and judicial challenges to individual ballots.'52 When the news media
counted the ballots (and they did not have to worry about the time taken with
judicial challenges to the recount rules and the application of those rules), they did
not complete the task for months.153
VII. CONCLUSION
Some who criticize Bush v. Gore argue that there was no federal issue.
Anyone who saw the televised hearing with Florida Judge Sauls, the trial judge
who ruled against Vice President Gore in the contest phase of the recount, knew
that he and the attorneys regularly talked about equal protection treating voters
equally. 154 The question is whether, in a federal election for president of the
United States, 155 a state court's order requiring a manual recount using
standardless procedures, and an order accepting partial recounts in a skewed
selection of precincts, violates equal protection. It is hard to think of anything
more federal than that.
While the Florida court spoke vaguely about finding the "intent" of the voter,
it was not examining a human being but looking at scratches on an inanimate
151 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 134-35 (Dec. 12, 2000) (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by
Breyer, J., on this issue).
152 See Gore, 772 So. 2d at 1269 (Dec. 8, 2000) (Wells, C.J., dissenting), pointing out that
in a very short time frame-
all questionable ballots must be reviewed by the judicial officer appointed to discern the
intent of the voter in a process open to the public. Faimess dictates that a provision be
made for either party to object to how a particular ballot is counted. Additionally, this short
time period must allow for judicial review. I respectfully submit this cannot be completed
without taking Florida's presidential electors outside the safe harbor provision, creating the
very real possibility of disenfranchising those nearly six million voters who were able to
correctly cast their ballots on election day.
(footnote omitted) (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166(6) (West 2000).
153 See Merzer, supra note 19 (noting that the Herald's review of undervotes lasted from
December 18 to March 13).
154 See, e.g., Gore v. Harris, No. 00-2808, (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 2000), at 6-7, available at
http://election2000.stanford.edu/00-243 1-transcript.pdf (order of Judge N. Sanders Sauls).
155 Cf Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 129-31 (1970). A very fragmented Court could
not agree on the constitutionality of various provisions of the Voting Rights Act Amendments
of 1970. However, a majority agreed that a federal law requiring states to lower the voting age
to eighteen was valid as to federal elections (president and vice president, U.S. senators, U.S.
representatives). The very fact that the election was for "federal" officials was sufficient to
support federal regulation.
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object. As the Miami-Dade Elections Supervisor said: "We look at the whole
ballot and try to make judgments."' 56 Any of the people who were examining the
ballots could add a scratch, either intentionally or unintentionally, by the way he
or she held the ballot.
The lack of rules allows people to manipulate the vote.157 If a person
representing the candidate was unencumbered by ethical self-restraint, and was
trying to change the vote total, he or she could eyeball a disputed ballot before
picking it up to officially inspect it. If the hanging chad indicated a vote for the
other side, the person would pick up the ballot very gently, so he could argue that
the voter really never intended to vote for the opponent. If the hanging chad was a
vote for his side, the person would handle the ballot vigorously, so that the chad
soon was no longer hanging.
But one need not assume intentional ballot-altering. Because no rules
governed this search for "intent," different counties used different rules, which
changed over time, so the vote totals would change all within the changing rules.
When the people were counting, they knew how many more votes the Vice
President would need to catch up, and they changed the way they counted votes
with this knowledge in mind. The Supreme Court noted:
Palm Beach County, for example, began the process with a 1990 guideline
which precluded counting completely attached chads, switched to a rule that
considered a vote to be legal if any light could be seen through a chad, changed
back to the 1990 rule, and then abandoned any pretense of a per se rule, only to
have a court order that the county consider dimpled chads legal. This is not a
process with sufficient guarantees of equal treatment. 158
If human beings instead of machines count the punch cards, how do you
count them where there is no hole, not even a pinprick, just a dimple? In Palm
Beach County, if the hand counters saw a card with several punches on it, and a
dimple near Vice President Gore's name, the election officials said that they did
not count it because that voter knew how to punch a card and did not punch a hole
next to Gore. The machine worked correctly when it did not read it because that is
what it is designed to do. Later, Palm Beach decided to ignore a 1990 guideline
that forbade counting ballots where the chads were completely attached, and there
was a dimple. Then it decided, for some of the ballots, to use no per se rule and
just decide, ballot by ballot, what to count.159
Not so in Broward County, which used, in the words of the Court, "a more
forgiving standard," and "uncovered" nearly three times as many votes, an
156 Ronald D. Rotunda, That It Takes to Win: Using the Psychic Hotline to Decide
Contested Races, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 26, 2000, § 1, at 19.
157 See Von Drehle et al., supra note 105.
158 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 106--07 (Dec. 12, 2000) (per curiam).
159 See id.
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outcome that was greatly disproportionate to the population difference between
these two counties.160 If some of the vote counters saw several clean punches for
other Democrats and no punch for Gore, not even an indentation, but they saw a
"scratch" near his name, they treated that ballot for Gore. The Florida Supreme
Court approved this unequal treatment of votes, and even exacerbated it by
ordering that additional votes from Broward County should be added to Gore's
certified total even though he had never even contested that county's
certification. 161 This selective recount, the Court concluded, violated the Equal
Protection Clause because it treats two voters differently, depending in which
counties they live.
One way to think of this decision is to assume that it is a month (or day)
before the election. The candidates of the two major parties gather in a room and
someone makes a proposal. Assume, we are told, that we learn, after the machine
count, that the election hinges on Florida, and the popular vote is very close. The
losing candidate asks for a second machine recount, but he still loses. The
question is this: If you do not know whether you are the candidate who is slightly
ahead, or slightly behind, would you approve of a statutory scheme that allows
the loser to ask for a manual recount that is limited to the counties where he is
very popular? That way, if each side gains votes firom the manual ballot count that
is in proportion to their machine total, you would expect that the loser to pick up
more votes from the county that already voted for him disproportionately. 162
In addition to limiting this manual recount to the counties where the loser is
more popular, we learn that the people manually recounting (many of whom are
members of his political party)163 will be allowed to count as valid votes any
ballot based on what they perceive might have been the voter's intent. 164 In other
words, would any rational candidate-before the election (at a time he or she
does not know who will be the loser or the winner of the machine count)-agree
160 See id. at 107.
161 See id. at 107-08.
162 Unless the voting machines are working improperly-and the lawsuits did not involve
that claim-recounting, either by machine or by hand, does not normally change the result.
Instead, it simply raises the total number of votes counted, in proportion to the votes originally
counted, f there is no mischief when the votes are recounted. Counting by hand increases the
number of votes counted, because a human being will accept more ballots than will the
machine. For example, the chad in the punch card may not be completely punched out, but the
human vote counter can recognize that and count the ballot. The hand count should increase the
total for both candidates, but in a way that is statistically proportional to the results from the
machine tabulation, if the human eye is nonpartisan.
163 See Elhauge, supra note 23, at 30 (noting that there were "20 percent more Democratic
counters than Republican counters, and that those Democratic counters were 25 percent more
likely to deny a mark.., for Bush").
164 A hand count of the ballots, before the standards for counting them are created, would
have poisoned the political air, for it would allow the winner of that flawed process to claim
victory even if a court later decides that the hand count was defective or corrupt.
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to a hand count of the votes before there exists any uniform standards for
counting the votes? Would any rational candidate agree to have a manual recount
in some counties of all the votes and a recount in other counties of just the
undervotes?
Let me answer my rhetorical question. No rational candidate-before the
election (at a time he or she acts objectively)--would agree to that lop-sided
procedure. No one would conclude that such a system is more fair or accurate
than a machine count or a hand count of all votes using the same standard
throughout the state. For that reason, we would not expect a rational legislature to
create such a system. But that is what the Florida Supreme Court ordered, after
knowing how people voted. The Florida court interpreted the statute to reach a
conclusion that no legislature could intend.
To this scenario let me add another fact-the Florida statute, which states it is
the Secretary of State's responsibility to "[o]btain and maintain uniformity in the
application, operation, and interpretation of the election laws. '165 The election
laws for a statewide election cannot be uniform when special rules apply to
certain counties, those that had overwhelmingly voted in favor one of the
candidates. That is yet another reason we would not expect a reasonable candidate
to agree to the procedure that the Florida Court had mandated and why we would
be surprised that a court would interpret the state law to require manual recounts
that preclude "uniformity in the application, operation, and interpretation of the
election laws." 166
The Supreme Court, in Bush v. Gore, simply ruled that a state cannot set
different standards for counting votes in different parts of the state, particularly
when it sets these standards after the fact-after it knows the results of the
machine count for each county. The state legislature's power to determine how
the electors are chosen does not allow the state court to violate the Equal
Protection Clause. Vote-counters and judges (who are human and put on their
judicial robes, two legs at a time, just like the rest of us) can be partisan. The
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, buttressed by the U.S. Supreme Court,
imposed objective rules on recounting in order to take this fact of life into
account.
165 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 97.012 (West 2002).
166 Id.
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